PROPOSALS FOR THE EPIRA LAW (RA 9136) REVIEW NEA

January 15, 2014 DOE Audio Visual Room, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City

| PROPONENT/SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS | RATIONALE/DISCUSSION | SPECIFIC PROVISION(S) AFFECTED | PROPOSED REWORDINGS OF PROVISION |
|---|----------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| A review of Section 32 of the law that mandates the government (and ultimately, the taxpayers) to automatically assume P200 billion in financial obligations of NAPOCOR should be reconsidered. | | Chapter II. Organization and Operation of the Electric Power Industry Section 32. NPC Stranded Debt and Contract Cost Recovery Stranded debt of NPC shall refer to any unpaid financial obligations of NPC. Stranded contract costs of NPC shall refer to the excess of the contracted cost of electricity under eligible IPP contracts of NPC over the actual selling price of the contracted energy output of such contracts in the market. Such contracts shall have been approved by the ERB as of December 31, 2000. The national government shall directly assume a portion of the financial obligations of NPC in an amount not to exceed Two hundred billion pesos (P200,000,000,000,000,000) xxx | |

| Chapter II. Organization and | Chapter II. Organization and Operation of |
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| Operation of the Electric Power | the Electric Power Industry |
| Industry Section 34 of the law states that "a universal charge to be determined, fixed, and approved by the ERC shall be imposed on all electricity end-users". This should be reviewed to minimize the impact on electricity rates that add to consumers' burden. | Section 34 (e). Universal Charge Xxx (e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years. Xxx Chapter !! Organization and Operation of |
| | the Electric Power Industry Section 34. Universal Charge |
| EPIRA bars cross-ownership between generation/distribution and transmission, but not between generation, distribution and supply. Safeguards should therefore be strengthened against co-ownership and abuse of market power. | Chapter IV Regulation of the Electric Power Industry Section 45. Cross Ownership, Market Power Abuse and Anti-Competitive Behavior. No participant in the electricity industry or any other person may engage in any anti-competitive behavior including, but not limited to, cross-subsidization, price or market manipulation, or other unfair trade practices detrimental to the encouragement and protection of contestable markets. |
| | No generation company, distribution utility, or its respective subsidiary or affiliate or stockholder or official of a generation |

| | company or distribution utility, or other |
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| | entity engaged in generating and supplying |
| | electricity specified by ERC within the |
| | fourth civil degree of consanguinity or |
| | affinity, shall be allowed to hold any |
| | interest, directly or indirectly, in TRANSCO |
| | or its concessionaire. Likewise, the |
| | TRANSCO, or its concessionaire or any of its |
| | stockholders or officials or any of their |
| | relatives within the fourth civil degree of |
| | consanguinity or affinity, shall not hold any |
| | interest, whether directly or indirectly, in |
| | any generation company or distribution |
| | utility. Except for ex officio government- |
| | appointed representatives, no person who |
| | is an officer or director of the TRANSCO or |
| | its concessionaire shall be an officer or |
| | director of any generation company, |
| | distribution utility or supplier. |
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| | Chapter VIII General Provisions Section |
| | 68. Review of IPP Contracts |
| A more defined policy on the | |
| exercise of "thorough review" of | An inter-agency committee chaired by the |
| all remaining IPP contracts and | Secretary of Finance, with the Secretary of |
| provide sanctions for failure to | the Department of Justice and the Director |
| take necessary actions in cases | General of the National Economic |
| where contracts are found to be | Development Authority as members |
| grossly disadvantageous or | thereof is hereby created upon the |
| onerous to the government. | effectivity of this Act. The Committee shall |
| | immediately undertake a thorough review |
| | of all IPP contracts. In cases where such |
| | contracts are found to have provisions |

| | | | which are grossly disadvantageous, or | |
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| | | | onerous to the Government, the | |
| | | | Committee shall cause the appropriate | |
| | | | government agency to file an action under | |
| | | | the arbitration clauses provided in said | |
| | | | contracts or initiate any appropriate action | |
| | | | under Philippine laws. The PSALM | |
| | | | Corporation shall diligently seek to reduce | |
| | | | stranded costs, if any. | |
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| | | | Chapter IV Regulation of the Electric Power | |
| 1. | | Enforce better regulation of bilateral | Industry | |
| | with vertical market power from further acquisition of | contracts. Generation should be placed as close at average cost as possible and | Saction AF Cross Ownerships Market | |
| | NPC generation assets to | allow agreements to span life of | Section 45 Cross Ownerships, Market | |
| | avoid "cartel". | generation plants. | Power Abuse and Anti-Competitive | |
| | | generation provide | Behaviour | |
| 2. | Clearer guidelines on the | | Section 46. Fines and Penalties | |
| | regional generation capacity | | | |
| | share limits to curb | | | |
| | horizontal market power. | | | |
| 3. | Setting of lower limit on the | | | |
| Э. | amount of supply that maybe | | | |
| | sourced through bilateral | | | |
| | contracts. Generation should | | | |
| | be placed as close at average | | | |
| | cost as possible and allow | | | |
| | agreements to span life of | | | |
| | generation plants. | | | |
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